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One might conceive of terrorist acts asbeing partly theatrical and dramatic.But the drama of terrorism is real
rather than staged. Actual persons are physically
and emotionally hurt, and many perish as a result
of alleged terrorist acts. Those who are putting up
the act willingly risk their own well-being,
including their own lives. But those who are
targeted are the reluctant victims. While alleged
terrorists and their victims are the real actors in a
Machiavellian drama, the alleged terrorists’
message is frequently aimed at influencing and,
if possible, coercing a larger audience, be it
domestic or international. 
Terrorism as the use of theatrical but real violence
or the threat of it to intimidate one’s enemies has
a long-standing pedigree in human history. As any
drama, however, its interpretations vary
depending on contextual considerations. 
As a polysemic term with multiple and evolving
meanings, terrorism stands out not only as a
contestable but also toxic term. Contestable
because reasonable people disagree about the
meaning of terrorism, and toxic because those who
engage in so-called terrorist violence try to justify
or excuse it by appealing to such a contestability.
While journalists, scholars, politicians, social
policy experts and ordinary citizens continue to
use the term terrorism assuming that it conveys
a clear and noncontroversial meaning, some
contend that we are better off moving away from
using the term to avoid an illusion of meaning
invariance. Still, others argue to stop using the
term terrorism because oftentimes its use is
partisan. For example, nonstate actors who
engage in political violence and their supporters
defend their strategy by proclaiming the
hackneyed slogan: “one person’s terrorist is
another person’s freedom fighter.”
Apparently, in its new forthcoming guidelines the
BBC is discouraging reporters from using the
words “terror” and “terrorism” to avoid
partisanship.1 While the intention behind the
alleged new guidelines can be praiseworthy,
those who follow them might end up describing
vicious and gruesome acts of violence motivated
by broadly construed political considerations
against innocent civilians simply as ordinary
violent acts rather than as terrorist acts. Such a
presumably nonpartisan description conflates an
ordinary criminal act with a politically motivated
criminal act.
Some argue that we can get an understanding of
terrorism by focusing on how people use the term
in different contexts. Others argue, as Supreme
Court Justice Potter Stewart infamously claimed
in the 1964 Jacobellis v. Ohio case when trying
to define hard-core pornography: “I know it when
I see it.” None of these two approaches seem
promising for elaborating an adequate and
persuasive definition of terrorism. 
In the first approach, people describe all sorts of
violent acts or threats as terrorism without being
consistent in their descriptions. Moreover, some
argue that those who frequently ascribe the term
to nonstate actors alone are being one-sided in
their ascriptions. We know that the number of
innocent victims killed or seriously harmed as a
result of terrorism by nonstate agents pales in
comparison with the millions of innocent victims
that have been and are still being killed or
seriously harmed by what one could describe as
state-sponsored political violence or state
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terrorism. True, the charge of “state terrorism”
has no legal standing in international law
because states are assumed to behave decently,
but that is just a fallacious assumption. States
can be charged with war crimes or crimes
against humanity, both of which are proscribed
by international law. Nonetheless, it is virtually
impossible to prosecute a powerful state under
the already-mentioned charges unless it has
been already defeated in war, in which case it is
no longer a powerful state. That is what
happened to Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan
after World War II.
The second approach seems unconvincing too
because it implies a rather shallow relativism and
an unworkable theory of meaning. Like the term
“hard-core pornography,” the term “terrorism”
presents a challenge to those who choose to
define it. By reverting to a pure subjectivist
approach as Justice Potter Stewart argued
regarding pornography, a person is just skirting
the already-mentioned challenge. “I know it when
I see it” is neither an explanation, nor a
justification, nor an excuse but a trivialization of
what the term stands for. To claim to know
whether a given practice constitutes terrorism by
just perceiving it is to relativize the content of the
claim. If the meaning of a term is determined by
each person’s perception, and each person’s
perception is likely to differ, then the term has no
interpersonal meaning. 
As the contrarian but comical Humpty Dumpty
character in Lewis Carrol’s classic work, Through
the Looking-Glass*, one can venture to offer a
Humpty Dumpty definition of terrorism. That is,
terrorism would simply mean whatever one wants
it to mean. And if and when someone challenges
one’s definition, one can always answer à la
Humpty Dumpty – the question is not whether I
can make words mean so many different things,
as Alice objected to Humpty Dumpty’s
arbitrariness in assigning his own meaning to a
word, but rather, who is to be the master in
assigning the meaning to a word, as Humpty
Dumpty replied. Such an ad hoc approach to the
meaning of words seems not only unhelpful but
also a nonstarter in trying to provide a universal
definition of international terrorism that could be
instrumental in implementing globally effective
counterterrorist measures. 
We can learn from Humpty Dumpty’s pointed
observation. One fundamental issue regarding the
meaning of terrorism is precisely “who is to be
the master” in assigning such a meaning. A
critical impediment in achieving a consensus in
defining the concept of international terrorism in
international law has been and still is that
powerful nations are reluctant to accept a
definition of terrorism that would apply to both
state and nonstate actors. States are adamant by
insisting that the ascription of terrorism be applied
only to nonstate actors. Also, some states that
have been and still are supporting surrogate
groups engage in wars of liberation are equally
adamant by insisting that there is a substantive
moral distinction between guerrilla groups fighting
wars of liberations against occupying powers and
terrorist groups. 
The international community can benefit from
adopting a nonpartisan universally acceptable
definition of international terrorism. For example,
at this moment in time different sources indicate
that global terrorism is down from previous
years. That is, of course, encouraging news. But
since there is no universally agreed definition of
international terrorism, statistics about alleged
terrorist acts suffer from being one-sided. That
is, most if not all the centres collecting empirical
data about alleged terrorist acts assume that
only nonstate actors are responsible for those
acts. Therefore, the data collected by these
centres is already biased in favour of state and
against nonstate actors. While the data is
ideologically tainted, some of it could be useful
for understanding where political violence is
more prevalent around the globe. Having such
an understanding might help the international
3community in designing and implementing
effective measures to address the root causes
of terrorism. 
Despite controversies about fixing the meaning of
the term “terrorism,” there is widespread
consensus that a necessary condition for
classifying an act as a terrorist act must involve
the actual use or the threat of violence for political
purposes broadly construed. I define terrorism as
“the use of political violence by individuals or
groups who, with the aim of influencing a
domestic or an international audience ,
deliberately or recklessly inflict substantive
underserved harm or threaten to do so on those
who can beyond reasonable doubt be conceived
of as innocent non-combatants.”2
On the one hand, those who are biased in favour
of states and against nonstate actors will
underscore that my definition is too broad
because it allows for the possibility that states
might engage in terrorist acts. On the other hand,
those who are biased in favour of alleged guerrilla
groups or freedom fighters will highlight that my
definition is too narrow because it neglects a
morally significant distinction between those who
engage in wars of liberation against occupying
powers and terrorist groups. Both opposing
camps, however, obviate a fundamental issue.
Regardless where the violence is coming from, it
is categorically unjustifiable to deliberately or
recklessly inflict substantive harm and least of all
kill those who are innocent beyond reasonable
doubt. A definition of international terrorism needs
to focus on those who are affected the most by
the actual violence or the threat of it, namely the
innocent victims of such despicable acts. 
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